

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

Cuba

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November 5, 1962

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
FROM: W. W. *W* Rostow
SUBJECT: Report Number Seven of the Planning Subcommittee.

1. The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of Monday afternoon, November 5, 1962.

2. It was broadly agreed that one of three situations was likely to emerge, soon or late, in the wake of the Castro-Mikoyan talks.

a. A renewed major crisis over offensive weapons, should the Soviets decide to stick on IL-28s and the submarine base.

b. A new version of the status quo ante, in which offensive weapons are removed, and their removal verified by one ad hoc means or another; but in which Moscow reinforces its commitment to the Cuban revolution, continues military and technical assistance in defensive armaments; continues to support massively the Cuban economy; and seeks to negotiate a maximum relaxation of Free World pressure on Cuba, perhaps against some Cuban promise not to engage in "indirect aggression," but is prepared to sustain Cuba as a Communist enclave in the Caribbean, against continued Free World hostility, trade restrictions, etc. In this case, it is unlikely that any long-run inspection system for Cuba would be agreed. Some scepticism was expressed about political stability of this case, over any substantial period of time.

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c. A Soviet-Cuban movement towards "neutralization" in which the Soviet military presence and economic support would be phased down and Castro would finally be told to make the best terms he could with the Free World. In this case, the issue of long-run inspection, on the most favorable terms available to Cuba, would emerge as negotiable.

Option a, if chosen, should emerge soon enough and would, evidently, lead to a re-escalation of the crisis; although Moscow may attempt to negotiate the IL-28 and submarine base threats against a tightening of the "no-invasion" commitment, under case b. The Soviet choice between b and c may be hard immediately to detect, since Moscow would probably wish to conceal from both Castro and the world for some time that it has, in fact, opted for choice c. The first indexes of the choice Moscow has made are likely to be: long-run inspection arrangements and the degree to which Cuba seeks widened trade with the Free World.

The final choice may depend on Moscow's assessment of how much "non-invasion" protection for a Communist Cuba can be bargained against long-run inspection arrangements, on the one hand, and against a Cuban promise not to engage in "indirect aggression" on the other. The compulsions on Moscow not to appear to be surrendering communism in Cuba, in the light of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its recent set back, will be very great.

3. In the light of this view, it was judged essential that the Executive Committee examine its response to the negotiating positions which emerge from Havana on the short-run issues of inspection in the light of our own long-run objectives towards Cuba. It was the general view that the U.S. position should appear so tough that, in fact, Moscow opts for choice c without immediately revealing it; since Castro (and Communism in Cuba) is unlikely to survive for long in a "neutralized" environment. In addition to the maintenance -- or even tightening of the blockade, various

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tough moves by the OAS may be essential in the next negotiating phase; e.g., breaking of diplomatic relations; warning action on indirect aggression, etc. Mr. Hurwitch, ARA, will attempt to relate the short and longer run positions when the information from Havana emerges within the next 48 hours or so.

4. With respect to the planning tasks now under way the situation is as follows (reference to Report Number Five unless otherwise indicated);

-- DOD is at work on a fundamental review of Soviet nuclear policy, which may take some weeks (3a); and the CIA, on a quick rough costing out of the military alternatives apparently open to the USSR (Report Six, para. 7).

-- Mr. Harvey's group has circulated a paper entitled "Soviet Scenario for Post-Cuban Negotiations With the U.S."

-- As noted above, Mr. Hurwitch, ARA, is proceeding with the analysis of possibilities of change inside Cuba in the light of the Mikoyan-Castro talks (3c).

-- A first preliminary assessment of some lessons to be drawn from the Cuban crisis (a draft paper by Mr. Rowen and Colonel Armstrong) is being circulated and will be reviewed by the Tuesday Planning Group on November 6 ("Some Lessons From the First Two Weeks of the Cuban Crisis").

-- FE and S/P are examining task 3e (Viet Nam).

-- Papers have gone forward to the Secretary of State on accelerated political and military cooperation within the Atlantic partnership (3f).

-- Under task 3g the OAS is seized of both the Argentine resolution and the Venezuelan commitment to submit evidence of indirect aggression out of Havana.

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-- A draft of a detailed negotiating paper (3h) will go forward to the Secretary of State on Wednesday, November 7.

-- Responses to Circular telegram 816 are now coming in, in response to 3i, and they are being reviewed by regional bureaus under Mr. Jorden's leadership.

-- Mr. Jorden and Mr. Lindley have undertaken initiatives with respect to ACDA and the relevant bureaus with respect to 3j (Soviet duplicity and its exploitation).

5. The concept in Report Number Six, para. 8 -- on the inter-play between Soviet post-crisis choices and U.S. military and foreign policy -- has been introduced into the draft negotiating paper and will be explored in depth by Mr. Harvey's group.

6. The next meeting of the group will take place when the post-Mikoyan situation is more clear.

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